In recent years, public sector pensions have diverged from the private sector pension trend, in that the percentage of public employees participating in a defined benefit (DB) plan has held steady at around 90 percent, while the fraction of private sector workers with a DB plan has plummeted to around 20 percent (BLS, 2002) . Against the backdrop of 30 years of private pension experience with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), it is useful to note that US public sector pensions evolved prior to, and outside the purview of, this federal legislation. This different experience makes it invaluable to not only learn what effects state and local government pensions have on stakeholders -including participants, public sectors employers, and taxpayers but also to glean lessons that the public pension experience may offer to private industry.
A Brief History of Public Pensions
Public DB plans have engaged in substantial efforts to reinvent themselves in recent years, adding elements that increase their flexibility and portability. Nevertheless, public plans retain the core attributes of a traditional defined benefit model: that is, the employer bears investment risk and the plan pays lifelong benefits according to a specified formula. Against this backdrop, it remains the case that each of the over 2,000 public retirement systems has its own unique plan design, benefit stmcture, and governance anangement, set forth in a vast assortment of state constitutions, laws, and administrative rules. This mosaic of stmctures and features reflects each state's rich variety of legal, political, economic, and demographic cultures and history as well as its political subdivisions. In other words, state and local government plans are creatures of state constitutional, statutory, and case law. As such, public pensions are accountable to each state's legislative and executive branches, independent boards oftmstees which often include employee representatives and ex-officio publicly elected officials, and ultimately, the taxpayers of that jurisdiction.
Although some US public pensions date to the late 19 th century, most public plans were established between the 1920's and the 1940's. These were mainly of the defined benefit variety. Municipal governments led states and the federal government in'providing pension coverage for their workers, largely because the first groups to be covered-police, firefighters, and teachers-were established at the local level, by cities, towns, and school districts. As Clark et aL (2003) point out, these plans were initially financed from employee contributions, as a fonn of "forced saving plans," although over time, employers gradually took on greater responsibility for plan financing.
Because public employees initially had their own plans, the US Social Security system initially excluded state and local government workers due to uncertainty about whether the federal government could legally tax state and local employers, In 1950, Congress amended the Social Security Act to allow states to voluntarily provide social security coverage for their employees, if the state entered into an agreement with the Social Security Administration (Mitchell and Hustead, 2001) . Today, the majority of state and local government employees participate in social security; the remaining non-participants are teachers and public safety personnel though most public employees in seven states do not participate (Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Nevada, and Ohio), Where employees are exempt from social security contributions, the pension benefit and contribution levels are typically higher,
The passage of ERISA in 1974 and subsequent amendments were watershed events in the evolution of private industry pensions, but these had little impact on public pensions which remained largely untouched by federal regulation. As Metz noted (1988: 4) :
Governmental plans are specifically exempt from all of the substantive qualification requirements added to the (Internal Revenue) Code by Title II of ERISA (with the exception of the Section 415 maximum limitation on benefits), including those relating directly to participation, vesting, funding, prohibited transactions, joint and survivor annuities, plan merger and consolidation, alienation and assignment of plan benefits, payment of benefits, certain social security benefit increases, and withdrawal of employee contributions.
In addition, governmental plans are exempt from ERISA's other major provisions, including reporting and disclosure requirements (Title I) and plan termination insurance (Title IV). Although government plans are not subject to greater global competition boosting the need for more flexibility in plan design; and successful marketing efforts of consultants and DC plan service providers. (Rajnes, 2002) .
Nevertheless, there are also less appealing consequences of relying on DC plans as the primary retirement benefit (CBO, 2003) . For instance, DC plans are seen as an unreliable vehicle for ensuring financial security in retirement to the extent that investment risk is borne solely by individual participants; this is exacerbated when plan participants are poor investors. A study prepared for the Nebraska Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) found that fromI983-99, that system's DB plans generated an average of 11 percent aunually, but the system's DC participants paid returns of only 6 percent (Buck Consultants, 2000) . This occurred despite ongoing efforts by the PERS to educate participants on the importance of proper asset allocation.
Nebraska PERS also found that a large percentage of terminating DC participants cashed out their retirement saving rather than retaining them in a retirement account. One explanation for why public DC plan returns lag professionally invested DB portfolios is that the DC asset allocations are often quite conservative. For instance, approximately half of all assets held in 403b and 457 plans (primarily and exclusively used by public employees, respectively) were held in the form of annuity reserves at life insurance companies (ICI 2004) .
Another concern with DC plans as the primary retirement benefit is termed the "leakage"
problem, a term applied to describe a variety of circumstances when retirement assets are spent by plan participants prior to retirement. For example, leakage occurs if an employee chooses to spend his retirement assets after leaving a job, rather than rolling them over to an Individual
Retirement Account or to a new employer's retirement plan. Leakage also occurs when workers borrow against their retirement plan assets and then fail to repay the loans. A recent study by Brainard (2003:7) addressed the issue ofleakage as follows:
A good example of terminating participants spending, rather than saving, their retirement assets are in Nebraska, w:here state and county government employees historically have participated in a DC plan. A study of the Nebraska Public Employees Retirement System, conducted by a national actuarial consultant, found that 68% oftenninating participants cashed out their assets rather than rolling them over to another retirement plan. This finding is consistent with a Hewitt Associates study which found that more than two thirds of participants terminating from DC plans cash out their lump sum distributions rather than rolling them to other retirement accounts.
In what follows, we outline the key advantages of DB plans to public sector employees and employers, seeking to illustrate how this paradigm for retirement provision is well-situated to meet retirement needs of the future.
Benefits to Employees
The ideal mix of retirement income sources has long been described as a "three-legged stool," with one leg each representing social security, an employer pension, and individual savings. As a rule of thumb, financial planners recommend replacing approximately 70 to 80 percent of one's working income in retirement. Public sector DB plans help achieve this goal by linking employee salary and retirement income: thus a social security-eligible employee.retiring with 20 years of service in a typical public pension plan can expect the benefit to replace 35 to 40 percent of his salary. Combined with social security and personal saving, the retiree then finds the 70-80 percent target within reach. Retirees and beneficiaries of public DB plans received annual benefits of over $18,000 in fiscal year 2002 (Brainard 2004) . I In addition to the basic DB plan, many public employers today also offer a voluntary, supplemental retirement saving plan which enables workers to save on their own for retirement. The most popular public employer-sponsored supplemental savings plans are 457 plans, also known as deferred compensation plans, and 403(b) plans, commonly refened to TSA's or tax-sheltered annuities.
Retiree financial independence relies heavily on the guaranteed income replacement concept provided by a DB plan, and it also relies on the central concept that the retiree will continue to receive benefits until death. Further, most public DB plans provide joint and survivor annuity options, to ensure that spouses and other named beneficiaries will continue to receive a benefit even in the event of the death of the retiree (Mitchell and Hustead, 2001) . By contrast, defined contribution plans do not guarantee access to a life annuity nor joint and survivor benefits.
A factor receiving increasing attention in recent years is the point that public DB assets are held in trust for participants; the assets are normally administered by a governing board whose members are legal fiduciaries. Unlike private industry DB plans, which can be curtailed in the event ofthe plan sponsor's bankruptcy, public pension benefits generally cannot be reduced.
That is, ERISA protects only private sector DB benefits that have already accrued, while it does not protect the right to future benefit accruals. Constitutional provisions governing contract and property rights are generally interpreted as protecting not only accrued benefits but also future benefit accruals. This practice varies from state to state, with some state constitutions explicitly protecting pension benefits, while in other cases, statutes and case law expressly forbids cutting pension benefits. By contrast, state and local laws generally afford participants far greater protections, prohibiting public employers from diminishing the benefit formula, often with respect to future accruals. Another advantage of public plans is that most provide some form of protection against inflation. Since the median life expectancy of a 65-year old woman is 22 years in the US, inflation ofjust 2 percent will cut purchasing power by more than one-third over the retirement period. Public plans offer several mechanisms for adjusting benefits post retirement, including with periodic adjustments subject to legislative approval, automatic increases linked to the inflation rate, and annual automatic increases of a flat percentage or dollar amount (Brainard, 2003) .
Benefits to Employers
Pensions were introduced in the public sector to help public administrators attract and retain quality workers, to provide them with performance incentives, and to retire them in an orderly fashion (Eitelberg, 1997) . It is worth recognizing that goverurnents, in their dual roles as both employers and policymakers, are uniquely situated to promote retirement financial security and serve as models for private industry, in their capacity as employer to more than one in ten working Americans. Not only do public DB plans attract a diverse group; they also promote retention efforts by rewarding length of service. This is because DB plan formulas usually base the retirement benefit on a worker's salary during his final years of service and on his length of service. Since salaries tend to rise over time, DB plans typically calculate pension benefits based on the worker's final three or five years (final average salary or FAS). As the workforce changes, all employers will be challenged to compensate workers who possess required knowledge, skills, and institutional memory (Mulvey and Nyce, this volume.) DB plans may be key to retaining quality employees.
DB plans also encourage orderly turnover of personnel by allowing employees to depart from the workforce with a clear knowledge of their pension benefits and with the assurance that the benefit payment will continue for life. By contrast, the DC plan provides no assurance that an employee will be financially prepared for retirement at any specific age or level of experience.
Unfortunately this uncertainty (or, in some cases, certainty of the inadequacy of one's benefits) causes employees to remain on the job even when their ability to perform job duties is in decline.
Clearly this may also complicate the employer's role, forcing decisions with unpleasant consequences for everyone.
In recent years, public DB plans have grown more flexible in their ability to meet a range of new employer (and employee) objectives. Developments include shorter vesting periods; a majority of public employees now participate in plans with a vesting period of five years or fewer, down from 10 years a decade ago. In addition, many large statewide public retirement plans now allow participants to purchase service earned at another retirement system or in the military. Also many plans now permit terminating participants to take all or part of the employer contributions, and some allow retired participants to return to active employment while continuing to receive their pension benefits. The number of public sector hybrid plans, having both DB and DC plan characteristics, has risen, as has the number of plans permitting retiring participants to take a portion of their benefit as a lump sum at retirement. Some plans also now permit participants to share in investment earnings during the accumulation period.
Another feature of DB plans particularly valuable to public employers is their ability to help public employers temporarily adjust the criteria used to determine retirement eligibility (typically, age and years of service requirements). Such incentives target employees who qualify already for retirement or who are close to qualifying, many of whom may be older and have more experience and salary than other employees. Once the worker retires, his position can be held vacant temporarily or permanently, or he may be replaced with lower-paid employee.
Structured and managed properly, early retirement incentive plans have been deemed useful to public employers, especially in the short-term.
Public DB plans as Financial Engines
A not-yet-discussed beneficial aspcct of public DB plans is that their assets promote economic growth and vitality. Through their size, broad diversification, and focus on long-term investment returns, public pension funds stabilize and add liquidity to US and foreign financial Venture capital provides financing for new and rapidly growing companies; the innovations and efficiencies generated by start-up companies are considered critical to long-term economic growth. In the last decade, many public retirement systems have established target allocations to venture capital projects within their own state (PSRSINTRS, 2002) . These investments seek to provide a return to the pension fund commensurate with the investment's level of risk, and also to promote economic growth and development in the state. Venture capital typically requires at least ten years to fully mature, making it a natural match,for defmed benefit assets (McDonald, 2002) . This is because of DB funds' focus on long-term investment results and because these funds pool assets for large numbers of participants, aceumulating portfolios large enough to commit to venture capital projects. In addition, DB plans also invest in other asset classes with the same long-term focus they demonstrate with venture capitaL
As consumers, retired pension participants spend their benefits on a range of goods and services. These expenditures increase economic demand and promote employment, generating additional economic'activity, which begets additional demand and employment. This is known as the multiplier effect: the effect of a single dollar has an economic impact greater than one dollar as it ripples through the economy. In an analysis described in more detail in the Appendix, we estimate the impact of the higher earnings from DB plans versus those available from DC plans which take into account lower investment earnings. We evaluate the impact of these higher investment gains on the gross, product of the five states with the largest public pension distributions in fiscal year 2002 (California, New Y mk, Texas, Ohio, and Illinois). In particular,
we assume a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of 0.67, which implies an economic multiplier effect of3.0. Benefit payments from these five states comprised approximately 44 percent of the $110 billion in public pension benefit payments in FY 2002. The difference between the actual bcnefits distributed by DB plans, and the estimated value of available DC benefits in these states of $25.78 billion. represents the marginal value added by public DB plans as a result of their investment returns over the inferred value of available DC benefits (see Table   1 ). contributions to public pension plans may be among the best investments a state or local government can make.
Conclusions
The economic boost of public pension benefits is likely to grow as public employees of the Baby Boomer cohort begin to retire, and public retirement systems begin to payout increasingly larger benefit amounts. In our view, public pension plans are in a strong position to handle the coming influx of retirees, since, unlike social security (mainly a pay-as-you-go program); public pensions are rather well-funded (approximately 95 percent in 2003). Investing the $2.3 trillion in public pension assets and the flow of benefit payments to annuitants promises a continuous, predictable, and growing source of economic stimulus. Moreover, through efficient asset management and pooling of resources, public defined benefit pension plans have a significant, positive effect on financial markets and the economy.
In general, public employers recognize that DC plans have many positive attributes, but to make them work well, many factors must fall into place: participants must consistently make sound investment decisions over their working and retired lives; they must remain in the workforce steadily, avoiding lengthy time off for having children, raising a family, completing an education, or for illness; they must have a sufficient amount withheld from their pay; they must avoid borrowing against and spending their retirement assets; and they must make appropriate decisions regarding withdrawal rates during retirement. Even then, employees might exhaust their assets after retirement. Hence having a DB plan as the primary retirement benefit protects public sector employees against many of these problems Public DB pension plans have also enabled public employers to achieve important objectives related to the reeruitment and retention of quality workers. These plans finaneial security in retirement and reduce retiree reliance on public assistance programs. The fact that these plans have evolved relatively independently of the federal regulatory structure governing private pensions has allowed the public plans to engage in an ongoing process of creating and modirying plan designs and governance structures to meet the unique needs of public sector employers. The independence, flexibility, and profitable prudence of these plans will continue to support public employers in their ongoing mission to serve taxpayers, while providing financial security to retired public employees and significant economic benefits to their communities ..
Public plans are, indeed, a useflll component of the new retirement paradigm of the future.
Technical Appendb:
The multiplier effect described in the text is based on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) which refers to the proportion of each additional dollar of household income used for consumption. As Keynes (1936) noted, people tend to consume more if their income rises, but this consumption gain tends to be less than the rise in their income. The MPC states that a worker who receives an increase in salary 0[$100 per month will spend some, but not all, of the entire $100; savings and taxes will make up the difference. It can be expressed as a formula:
MPC ttl -MPS t, which simply means that the marginal propensity to consume equals the change in income minus savings minus taxes. The multiplier effect can be derived from the MPC as l/(l-MPC).
To compare actual benefits paid by public DB pensions and the benefits that might have been payable by DC plans earning lower assumed investment returns, we reduced by ten percent the amount paid by public DB pensions to reflect migration of retired participants from the five states. This reduces the DB payments figure to $44.2 billion. For the 20-year period ended in 2002, public DB plans experienced annualized investment returns of 10.03 percent. As a base of comparison, using the Nebraska benefits adequacy study and the Investment Company Institute report on the asset allocation of 403b and 457 plan participants as a guide, we assume a net annualized investment return for DC plans during the same period of 6.5 percent. Based on the'se rates, the DC plan portfolio would have returned 41.7 percent ofthe investment gains aecmed by the DB plan. Applying this proportion-41.7 percent-of the investment earnings DC plans would have generated, to the benefits actually distributed by public DB plans in the five states, yields $18.4 billion. This amount is referred to here as the inferred value ofavailable DC benefits, and represents a level of assumed DC plan benefits that can be compared with the amount actually distributed by DB plans.
While this exercise illustrates how public DB plans can have a positive effect due to their superior investment returns, relative to DC plans, there are other factors that must also be mentioned. For instance, we assumed that DC plans would pay benefits in the same proportion to their investment earnings as DB plans, but in fact we cannot know at what rate DC plan assets will actually be spent. Also we assumed that DC and DB contribution rates would have been the same. In view of the fact that some DB contributions over this period were actually intended to reduce underfunding, it is possible that contributions to DC plans would have been lower than these. In any event, our central finding-that DB contributions yield positive long-term economic results-suggests that higher contribution rates literally have been a good investment, not only for taxpayers, but also for public employers and employees. Additionally, this analysis assumed a consistent contribution rate relative to investment gains and benefit payments, though actual contribution rates varied across states. Also we did not attempt to determine additional tax revenues generated by higher DB payments; rather we assumed that the DC and DB plans produced similar rates ofleakage, though most public DB plans do not permit loans. Finally, we assumed that the administrative cost of the plan types is identical, though public DB plans typically have administrative expenses considerably lower than those of DC plans. Factoring this in would likely strengthen the case for the economic value of DB versus DC plans. 
